Research

We estimate the effect of the Mexican drug war on Mexico-to-U.S. migration and the resulting effects on population, employment, and wages in U.S. labor markets. Our empirical strategy compares U.S. counties differentially connected to Mexican municipalities through historical migration networks, using drug violence triggered by close municipal elections in 2007–2008 as a source of exogenous variation. Over the following decade, migrants fleeing the violence—the vast majority of whom are undocumented—cause native-born U.S. workers’ employment rates to increase and unemployment rates to fall, while wages do not change. Employment gains are largest for natives without a college degree. Employment effects fade after a decade.

“Just cause” policies aim to discourage the arbitrary firing of employees. Recent efforts at passing such laws in the U.S. have been motivated by deterring discrimination. This paper presents a framework to study the effects of just cause when managers engage in taste-based discrimination. The framework generates predictions on whether just cause will ease achievement and retention of stable employment by exploiting the timing of separations around a probationary period. Since probationary periods are a typical feature of protections, the approach is generalizable. We test predictions using New York City’s 2021 just cause law for fast-food employees. Using a synthetic difference-in-differences design on publicly available data, we do not find results consistent with taste-based discrimination against black, Hispanic, female, or older workers, though lack of enforcement or data issues could be driving the nulls. Further analysis suggests another mechanism: screening discrimination against younger workers.

Despite widespread concern about teacher shortages, there is limited evidence on when job openings are posted and the supply of individuals applying for those openings. Using detailed job posting and application data from 19 school districts and 24 charter school organizations, we examine the seasonality of job postings, variation in applicant supply, and application patterns over the course of the hiring season. We find that 11% of jobs are posted late, with substantial variation across organizations. Regarding applicant supply, we find that school districts average fewer applicants per opening (3.3) than charters (6.1) and among districts, applicant supply is negatively associated with percentage of student eligible for free or reduced-price lunch and positively associated with salary. In contrast, among charters, we find no statistically significant relationship between applicant supply and either student demographics or salary. Timing also matters to applicant supply: for both districts and charters, jobs posted early in the hiring season attract roughly twice as many applications as those posted in the six weeks before school starts. While descriptive in nature, our findings add depth and specificity to the existing evidence on teacher supply.

This paper models fair workweek regulations that require employers to provide employees with 1) schedule predictability via advance notice of their work schedule and premium payments for short-notice changes, and (2) access to hours meaning they must offer open hours to existing employees before hiring new workers. We develop a theoretical model of employers’ responses to these provisions and their implications for employment. Guided by the model, we estimate the effects of recently-adopted fair workweek regulation in New York City’s fast-food sector using a synthetic difference-in-differences design. We find a null employment effect.