Pension Incentives and Job Mobility Alan L. Gustman and Thomas L. Steinmeier First Chapter | Table of Contents 173 pp. 1995 $17.00 paper 978-0-88099-151-3 The conventional view that pensionsparticularly backloaded pensionsdeter job mobility is challenged in this book by Alan L. Gustman and Thomas L. Steinmeier. Previous work in this area has concluded that, because many pension-covered workers who typically are enrolled in defined benefit programs face the threat of losing some or all pension assets they may have accumulated by changing jobs, they are more likely to stay put. Using models which incorporate an array of behaviors generally omitted from conventional models relating backloading to turnover, Gustman and Steinmeier find that backloading plays only a slight role in explaining mobility differences associated with pension coverage. They propose that higher wages often paid at pension-covered jobs play a greater role in reducing mobility than do pensions. This examination of factors influencing job mobility is also relevant for its models of wage determination and its analysis of industry and compensating wage differentials. "Gustman and Steinmeier are to be credited with staking out a new position in the debate on how pensions affect mobility and making a highly credible case for that position. Those with either a policy or professional interest in pensions should pay serious attention to their work, as should academics with an interest in pay and mobility." –Industrial and Labor Relations Review |